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Abstract
Work-related stress can lead to substantial health problems and thereby result
in immense costs for establishments. Therefore, the question as to what extent
establishments contribute to their employees’ stress levels is of great importance
for firm performance. We investigate the relationship between personnel policies
and work-related stress by considering a series of personnel policies that refer to
a worker’s job reward, job demand, or job control situation. Using data from the
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) we find statistically significant associations
of several policies and work-related stress. Most importantly, bad promotion oppor-
tunities and low working time control turn out to be associated with higher stress
levels, while the opposite is true for an adequate salary.
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1 Introduction
Work relations have dramatically changed in most industrialized countries since the early
1990s. Increasing competition and technological change pose high flexibility demands on
both establishments and employees. Therefore, the latter are increasingly confronted with
rising job demands as well as flexible working arrangements. Although this development
may bring about advantages from an employee’s perspective, work-related health problems
are on the rise as various official numbers indicate. This particularly concerns health
problems associated with mental strain and stress. In the European Working Conditions
Survey 2010 over 26% of the respondents from the EU27 countries report to experience
stress at work “always or most of the time”, and an additional 40% state to do so at least
“sometimes” (Eurofond, 2010). Moreover, according to a European Commission report
about 9% of the European working age population with health problems suffer most from
mental health problems (Oortwijn et al., 2011). Over 14% of those working but having
health problems, report to suffer most from stress, depression or anxiety (Eurostat, 2010).
Finally, more than 50% of the respondents, who state stress, depression or anxiety to be
their major work-related health problem, had to go on sick leave in the last twelve months
and over 20% missed out on more than a month of work (Eurostat, 2010).
Work-related stress can lead to substantial health problems such as cardiovascular
disease, musculoskeletal disease, back pain, depression, and burnout (e.g., Béjean and
Sultan-Taïeb, 2005). The resulting costs pose an increasing challenge on establishments as
ill employees are less productive and have higher absenteeism rates. For instance, Goetzel
et al. (2003) name back disorders and depressions, illnesses that are associated with stress,
among the ten most costly for U.S. enterprises. Moreover, disregarding subsequent health
problems, stress at work itself has been shown to be a predictor for absenteeism and
quitting intentions (Leontaridi and Ward, 2002). Thus, establishments are confronted
with the question, to what extent they contribute to their employees’ stress.
While stress is a very widely used term, its definition remains vague.1 According
to Kinman and Jones (2005, p. 101) a general definition of stress is that it “is the
product of an imbalance between appraisals of environmental demands and individual
resources”. The two mostly used conceptional frameworks in epidemiology for work-related
stress are the Job Demand-Control (JDC) model (Karasek, 1979) and the Effort-Reward
Imbalance (ERI) model (Siegrist, 1996). Both frameworks are broadly in line with this
1See, for instance, Kinman and Jones (2005) for a discussion of the term workplace stress and the
comparison of academic and layman understanding of the concept. For instance, in psychology there
is a linguistic differentiation between stress and strain. While the first is the trigger or stressor, the
latter is the outcome (Kinman and Jones, 2005). However, given the orientation of this paper, we remain
in the layman terminology referring to the outcome also as stress as it has been previously done in
economics (e.g., Hamermesh and Lee, 2007; Johnston and Lee, 2013). Furthermore, we disregard positive
connotations of the term, namely that stress can also be understood as a positive stimulus that enhances
the productivity of an individual.
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general definition of stress and predict that an unfavourable combination of workload and
responsibility or reward is detrimental to an individual’s health.
In this paper, we investigate which human resource management practices tend to in-
crease or mitigate the workers’ stress levels. We regard the identification of such practices
as relevant for firm performance. We contribute to the existing literature in a threefold
way. First, most studies dealing with work-related stress use small data samples stemming
from very specific populations. On the contrary, we aim to answer the proposed question
utilizing a large representative household data set, the German Socio-Economic Panel
(SOEP). Second, most related studies focus on a single personnel policy measure as main
explanatory variable (e.g., Johnston and Lee, 2013), while we consider a series of per-
sonnel policy measures that may mutually influence work-related stress. Specifically, we
consider the employees’ working time arrangements, the benefit of a computer (or laptop)
for private use, paid overtime hours, regular performance appraisals, salary adequacy, and
promotion opportunities in our analysis. Finally, our data allow us to include a rich set
of covariates reflecting individual and job characteristics as well as important life events
that might also influence a worker’s stress perception. This contributes to obtain more
precise parameter estimates and limits the consequences of an omitted variables bias. In
addition, we explicitly address other endogeneity issues that may be associated with our
personnel policy measures by applying appropriate regression techniques. Provided that
our approach to examine the stress consequences of various personnel policy measures
prevents us from exercising an instrumental variables estimation to obtain causal effects,
our applied estimation strategy is supposed to produce meaningful results that might
serve as an early warning system for employers who are interested in identifying potential
stress factors at work.
Our results indicate that bad promotion opportunities and low working time control
are associated with higher stress levels, while salary adequacy is associated with lower
stress levels. This holds in both (pooled) OLS and individual fixed effects specifications.
Most of the results remain robust, when we exploit an exogenous source of variation of
personnel policies by only considering individuals who did not change jobs in the period of
observation. Although accounting for time-invariant individual fixed effects and exploiting
exogenous variation do not allow us to interpret our estimates as causal effects, these
procedures are supposed to reduce potential endogeneity biases by addressing important
sources of endogeneity such as time-constant unobserved heterogeneity and self-selection.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the
background literature. In Section 3 we present the data, our key variables, and descriptive
statistics. Section 4 continues with our empirical strategy. In Section 5, we present and
discuss our estimation results. In Section 6 we conduct a sensitivity analysis, before
Section 7 concludes.
2
2 Background literature
Two very influential conceptional frameworks explaining work-related stress are the Job
Demand-Control (JDC) model (Karasek, 1979) and the Effort-Reward Imbalance (ERI)
model (Siegrist, 1996). The JDC model’s basic implication is that individuals feel over-
loaded when there is a disproportion between workplace requirements (job demand) and
worker autonomy (job control). The demands are the job stressors or the workload, and
the job control is the decision latitude an individual has over his activities. The model’s
postulation is that a relatively low level of control compared to high demands will re-
sult in mental stress, while a high level of demand combined with high decision latitude
is described as an active job that leads to an adaptation to the situation, because the
individual acquires new behavioural patterns.
Similarly, the ERI model (Siegrist, 1996) states that an imbalance between the costs
and benefits of a job leads to stress, i.e., the combination of low reward (e.g., bad promo-
tion opportunities) and high effort (e.g., high workload) is particularly unfavourable to
an individual’s health. Initially developed to explain cardiovascular diseases, the model’s
application has been extended to behavioural and psychological outcomes (for a review
see van Vegchel et al., 2005). The ERI model distinguishes between extrinsic (situation-
specific) and intrinsic (person-specific) dimensions, called effort and overcommitment.2
An individual’s effort is determined by extrinsic factors like job demand and obligations,
while overcommitment depicts how an individual perceives his effort–reward situation,
thereby influencing health outcomes indirectly.
In both conceptual frameworks one major component of the perceived overload or
effort is time pressure. Time pressure is also one way in which economists have conceptu-
alised stress. Hamermesh and Lee (2007) model stress as a time constraint that binds an
individual. In their model, stress is the outcome “generated by feelings that the available
time is insufficient to accomplish the desired activities” (Hamermesh and Lee, 2007, p.
374).3
Several studies from occupational medicine have analysed the association between
working hours and health related outcomes. In this context, working hours arrangements
can represent two aspects, job demands (e.g., via high workload that manifests itself in
2The term effort may be a misleading notation in personnel economics, where effort is associated with
an employee’s willingness to work, which is a desired behaviour for employers. However, for Siegrist
(1996) effort means, that an individual has to deliver in order to fulfil the requirements of the job, which
may result in perceived burden.
3In respect to different worker population surveys this seems a very reasonable approach. For instance
“working under time and performance pressure” is the most frequently named (about 40%) work-related
burden in a German working conditions survey conducted by the Robert Koch Institute (Kroll et al.,
2011). Also, 62% of the overall (EU27) and 72.6% of the German individuals questioned in the Euro-
pean Working Conditions Survey 2010 state to work to tight deadlines “at least a quarter of the time”
(Eurofond, 2010).
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overtime) and job control when employees exert autonomy over their working schedule.
Nijp et al. (2012) review 63 publications on the relationship of different types of
working time control (e.g., control over daily working times, vacation days or overtime)
and various work-related outcomes. They do not find a consistent overall effect of working
time control on employee health and well-being, but can support the idea that flexible
working time arrangements are positively associated with employee health and well-being.
The famous Whitehall II studies deal with the health impacts of job control. These
studies followed the health development of British civil servants over several years and
show negative associations between low job control (represented by job rank) and various
health outcomes such as higher risk for coronary heart disease (Bosma et al., 1998; Marmot
et al., 1997) or depression and anxiety (e.g., Stansfeld et al., 1999). Bosma et al. (1998)
also tested the ERI model and found that an imbalance of efforts and rewards is associated
with a significantly higher risk for coronary heart disease. Also, van Vegchel et al.’s (2005)
review of more than 40 studies testing the ERI model finds support for the hypothesis
that an unfavourable effort–reward combination is detrimental to individual health.
Van Doef and Maes (1999) review over 60 studies concerning the JDC model and
psychological well-being. The analysed studies touch upon both aspects, job demands
and job controls. Van Doef and Maes (1999) find that a large share of the reviewed
studies supports the hypothesis that high job demands deteriorate well-being. However,
evidence is rather mixed for the hypothesis that higher job control is associated with
higher levels of well-being.
So far, only a few contributions from the field of economics have dealt with the
outcomes of workplace characteristics on stress. So without the intention of drawing
a complete picture we conclude this section by summarizing recent findings of workplace
characteristics on stress, but also on related outcomes like health, well-being and job
satisfaction.
In regard to the impact of single personnel policy measures on well-being, there are
studies analysing the effects of promotions on stress (Johnston and Lee, 2013), health
(Boyce and Oswald, 2012), and job satisfaction (Kosteas, 2011). Johnston and Lee (2013)
regress different measures of well-being including stress on promotions and account for
adaptation and anticipation effects. They find that promotions lead to more stress with
the effect peaking about three years after the promotion. Although they also find that the
perceived job control increases following a promotion, the increased job stress seems to
be the dominating outcome. Boyce and Oswald (2012) evaluate the effect of promotions
on health in a longitudinal setting and contrast previous findings of a positive association
between job control and health by stating that actually there is a selection of healthy
people into promotion, while after being promoted there are often substantial health
deteriorations.
In a European comparison of the effect of working conditions on various mental health
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indicators, Cottini and Lucifora (2013) find a statistically significant association of high
job demands and stress. Furthermore, they support the idea of a negative causal effect
of job demands on mental health by means of an instrumental variables (IV) regression,
where they instrument job demands by exploiting the variation of the work-related in-
stitutional framework over countries and time. In contrast to our study, Cottini and
Lucifora (2013) do not regard particular personnel policies, but group their explanatory
variables by job demands and hazards that cover, for instance, psychological stressors like
self-reported task complexities or support from colleagues.4
Furthermore, some research has been conducted on the effects of job satisfaction on
stress and health (e.g., Fischer and Sousa-Poza, 2009; Gupta and Kristensen, 2008). In this
context, Kleibrink (2014) has paid attention to the underlying drivers of job satisfaction
such as working hours. Several studies deal with the effects of (undesired long) working
hours on health and well-being (e.g., Bell et al., 2012; Robone et al., 2011; Wooden et
al., 2009).5 For instance, Bell et al. (2012) find evidence of a negative effect of so called
overwork, defined as the positive difference between actual and desired working hours,
on individuals’ subjective health. Finally, in a recent study Goh et al. (2015) estimate
that work-related mortality is the fourth largest death cause in the U.S. However, it
should be noted that Goh et al. (2015) regard ten different workplace practices that could
affect employee health including lay-offs and health insurance provision, which limits the
comparability of their results to our study.
None of the above mentioned studies has explicitly addressed the issue of the effect of
a series of personnel policies on stress. Therefore, we complement the existing literature
by analysing several personnel policies at once, which allows us to mimic the decision
scope of an employer who shapes an individual’s working place, thereby affecting his or
her stress level.
3 Data, variables, and hypotheses
For our analysis we use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).6 The
SOEP is an annual longitudinal household survey conducted since 1984 and is considered
to be the most important representative household survey in Germany. The SOEP ques-
tionnaires contain a wide range of individual and job-related characteristics, including
variables on health and individual well-being.7 However, while standard variables such as
socio-economic factors or wages are surveyed every year, a lot of additional information
4In their job demand measures they include “long working hours”, which is somewhat similar to our
explanatory variable of paid overtime (see Section 3.2).
5See Bassanini and Caroli (2014) for a survey on the relationship between working hours and health.
6More specifically, we use the SOEPlong v30 dataset.
7For more detailed information about the SOEP, see Wagner et al. (2007).
5
is only included on a bi-annual or even less regular basis.
In order to examine the relationship between work-related stress and human resource
management practices we rely on the SOEP waves of 2006 and 2011 since several job
stress related questions are included in these waves.8 These questions are in line with a
shortened version of the ERI questionnaire (Siegrist et al., 2009). However, we depart
from the original theoretical framework to some extent. In the ERI model, health risks are
measured by a weighted quotient of the effort and reward items. On the contrary to this
approach, we limit our stress view solely to the perceived burdens given by an individual’s
effort. However, we include selected reward items as representations of personnel policies
in our set of explanatory variables (see Subsection 3.2), because we assume that efforts
and rewards are not independent.9
Our analysis is restricted to workers aged between 20 and 65. Self-employed indi-
viduals, individuals enrolled in army or civil service, and apprentices are excluded from
the sample.10 Furthermore, individuals who earn less than 400€ per month (so called
mini-jobbers) are not taken into account.
It should be mentioned that the SOEP is not designed as a balanced panel as over the
course of the years individuals drop out of or enter the sample. Sometimes individuals
also miss out on survey years and are reintegrated in the sample later on. As we use
the years 2006 and 2011 and also aim at specifications that account for individual time-
invariant effects (see Section 4), we conduct our main analysis on the basis of a balanced
sample containing 4,800 observations. To the best of our knowledge, the SOEP is the
only German dataset that contains information on both individual stress perceptions and
job-related characteristics. Therefore, we consider these data as the most suitable for our
research question.
3.1 Dependent variable: the extrinsic stress index
Our dependent variable, the extrinsic stress index, is constructed from three items covering
stress caused by extrinsic factors. The three items consist of the following statements:
(i) “I have constant time pressure due to a heavy workload” (TPWL), (ii) “I have many
interruptions and disturbances while performing my job” (INTERRUPT), and (iii) “Over
the past few years, my job has become more and more demanding” (JOBDEM).11 All these
items are measured in two stages. First, the respondents are asked to confirm or deny
8The original questionnaires and their translations into English can be retrieved online http://www.
diw.de/de/diw_02.c.238114.de/frageboegen_methodenberichte.html.
9It is, for instance, reasonable to consider both working conditions and the rewards like salary to be
fixed in the employment contract and form an individual’s expectations regarding his job.
10Self-employed individuals are excluded because they are by definition not subject to any employer’s
personnel policy measures.
11These items represent a shortened operationalization of the effort component in the ERI model
(Siegrist et al., 2009).
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whether a certain statement applies to them or not. Thereafter, they have to indicate on
a 1 (“not at all”) to 4 (“very heavily”) scale, to what extent they feel burdened by the issue
the particular item covers. Following Richter et al. (2013), the answers are then recoded
to a five-point Likert scale, so the higher the score, the more burdened an individual feels
by the particular item.
In order to construct a convenient overall stress index we follow Bresnahan et al.
(2002) and Bloom et al. (2011) by applying a double standardization approach. We first
standardize (STD) each recoded item into a variable with mean 0 and variance 1 by
subtracting each item’s mean and dividing the result by the item’s standard deviation.
This eliminates problems associated with different distributions on the items’ responses,
i.e., a larger share of individuals may respond to feel heavily burdened by time pressure
than by frequent interruptions. We then standardize the sum of the three standardized
items as presented in equation (1):
stressextit =STD[STD(TPWLit) + STD(INTERRUPTit)
+STD(JOBDEMit)].
(1)
Stressextit is the resulting extrinsic stress index for individual i at time t, again a stan-
dardized variable with mean 0 and variance 1. The second standardization allows for a
more convenient interpretation. A one unit change of an independent variable translates
into an stressextit change of standard deviations of our extrinsic stress index. Thus, the
higher the index value, the more burdened an individual feels.
3.2 Explanatory variables
The SOEP contains numerous work-related questions. Thus, the data offer several mea-
sures that are suitable for capturing the human resource management practices in an
individual’s workplace. We group the selected explanatory variables by the expected
channel of their effect on stress, i.e., job demand, job control, and job reward.
Job demand
In order to include a measure in our analysis that captures long working hours without
being related to an individual’s particularly strong motivation or work ethic, we rely on
paid overtime, as this variable rather indicates a company induced motive. The variable
measures how many paid overtime hours an individual worked in the month before the
survey.12 We assume that paid overtime is positively associated with higher stress levels,
because it reflects higher job demands.
12We recode the measure into weekly hours in order to make it comparable to other working hours
relevant information that is measured in hours per week.
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In cross-sectional specifications we consider whether individuals face performance ap-
praisals. This is a dummy variable with value 1 for individuals who are subject to regular
performance appraisals by their supervisors and 0 if this is not the case. Often the work
of individuals who are subject to performance appraisals is evaluated by pre-determined
goals and the achievement of these goals is important for subsequent promotion and re-
muneration decisions. Therefore, we assume that facing regular performance appraisals
might increase the perceived job pressure, and thus, job demand. Unfortunately, infor-
mation on performance appraisals is neither collected in 2006 nor in 2005, so we cannot
impute values of 2005 into 2006. Therefore, it is impossible to include this variable in our
longitudinal analysis.
Job control
We include an individual’s working time arrangement in our set of explanatory vari-
ables.13 The working time regimes to be considered are: fixed working time (FWT),
employer-determined working time (EDWT), self-managed working time (SMWT), and
flextime within a working hours account (FT).14 We create four dummy variables, indi-
cating whether or not an individual faces FWT, EDWT, SMWT, or FT. In the course of
the analysis, FWT serves as reference category. Table 1 displays the average contractual
and effective working hours of employees by working time arrangement.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
We can see that the difference between effective and contractual working hours is larger
for employees with flexible working hours, i.e., EDTW, SMWT, and FT employees, than
for FWT employees. This suggests that employees with flexible working hours face higher
job demands than employees with fixed working time.
In the first instance, however, the assignment of an employee to a certain working
time arrangement provides information on his level of job control. By definition, FWT
and EDWT employees have low working time autonomy and thus low job control with
regard to scheduling individual working time, while FT employees and especially SMWT
employees face higher levels of working time autonomy and thus job control. Therefore,
we expect that EDWT (i.e., high job demand combined with low job control) is associ-
ated with higher stress levels, while FT and particularly SMWT (i.e., high job demand
combined with high job control) are expected to mitigate the stress-enhancing effect of
longer working hours.
13All uneven SOEP waves from 2003 through 2011 contain information on an individual’s working time
arrangement. For 2006 we utilize the information from 2005, if the individual holds the same position at
the same company as in the previous year.
14See Beckmann et al., 2015 and Table A.1 in Appendix A.1 for more information and a precise
definition.
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Job reward
We continue to enrich our set of human resource practices by measures of positive and
negative job rewards. At first, we consider the fringe benefit, provision of a computer (or
laptop), in our analysis.15 This is a dummy variable taking on value 1 if an individual
receives a computer (or laptop) for personal use from his employer and 0 otherwise. In
our opinion, the impact of the provision of a computer for personal use on an employee’s
stress level is ambiguous. On the one hand, the provision of a computer for personal
use allows the employee to work more autonomously, thereby increasing perceived job
control. On the other hand, the provision of a computer for personal use can reinforce
tendencies to work on weekends or after closing time, which goes along with higher job
demands. In line with our argumentation on the higher job control associated with flexible
time arrangements, we expect the beneficial component of the computer to outweigh the
demand component.
Furthermore, we consider an individual’s response in regard to the promotion opportu-
nities in his company. Our measure is a dummy variable indicating whether an individual
states that the promotion opportunities in his company are bad. We assume that bad
promotion opportunities support higher stress levels as they reflect low job rewards.
An adequate salary reflects a company’s remuneration policy. We include a dummy
variable indicating whether an individual considers his salary as adequate. We expect
that an adequate salary mitigates an individual’s perceived stress level as it reflects a
high job reward situation.
3.3 Descriptive analysis
In Figure 1 we present descriptive statistics of our dependent variable, the extrinsic stress
index, depicted by the categories of the selected human resource practices for our full
sample. Recall that the higher the stress index, the higher the perceived stress level for
the respective group.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Individuals receiving a computer (or laptop) exhibit median extrinsic stress indices above
zero, while those who do not receive such a fringe benefit have a median below zero (Fig-
ure 1a). The median extrinsic stress index is higher for individuals believing that the
promotion prospects in their company are bad (Figure 1d), and for individuals subject
to regular performance appraisals (Figure 1f). On the contrary, those who believe their
15All even SOEP years from 2006 through 2012 cover a list of benefits provided by an employer. For
2011 we utilize the information from 2010, if the individual holds the same position at the same company
as in the previous year.
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salary to be adequate have lower (median below zero) extrinsic stress indices (Figure 1e)
than those who do not consider their salary as adequate (median above zero). Indivi-
duals who executed paid overtime in the month before the survey exhibit a higher median
extrinsic stress index than those who did not (Figure 1c).16 Finally, Figure 1b shows
the depiction of the extrinsic stress index by working time arrangements. FWT workers
exhibit the lowest median extrinsic stress index, while the median for those with EDWT,
SMWT and FT is visibly above zero. However, these figures display bivariate statistics
that provide only first insights regarding the assumed associations.
4 Empirical strategy
The aim of this analysis is to identify human resource practices that are associated with a
worker’s perceived stress level. As a starting point, we run a cross-sectional OLS regression
of our extrinsic stress index introduced in Section (3.1) on all personnel policy measures
that are available in our data. The observation period is the panel wave of 2011, as one
of our considered policies, performance appraisals, is only included in this wave. The
regression model is therefore specified as
stressexti = HRPiγ +Xiβ + ui. (2)
Here, HRPi is a vector of human resource practices for individual i, X is a vector of control
variables, and ui denotes an idiosyncratic error term with zero mean and finite variance.
The inclusion of X conveys the fact that an individual’s perceived stress level may also
depend on various factors that are not related to specific human resource practices. At
first, an individual’s stress level might be influenced by certain private life events that
happened in the year of the observation. For this reason, we include significant life events,
namely the birth of a child, a separation or divorce from partner or spouse, and the death
of a close relative to X.
Moreover, X includes individual characteristics such as age, years of schooling, gender,
nationality, marital status, the existence of children in the household, an individual’s self-
reported health status, as well as the number of hours devoted to leisure-time activities.
Our set of control variables is further enriched with job characteristics and variables from
an individual’s employment history that may affect his stress perception. These variables
include an individual’s monthly gross wage (in natural logarithms), the weekly contracted
working hours, the type of employment contract (fixed-term vs. permanent), the tenure
16Note that due to a large sample share of individuals with 0 of paid overtime in the month before the
survey (88%) we grouped this variable for convenience in simply two groups: individuals with 0 hours,
and those who had more than 0 hours.
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with the respective company, and the amount of years an individual has experienced in
unemployment and part time occupations, respectively. The job-specific variables also
include a dummy variable indicating whether an individual holds a management position
or is employed in the public sector. Also, we add dummies for the size of the company
at which the individual is employed and for the company’s sector affiliation. Finally, we
include a regional dummy for the worker’s place of residence (East or West Germany)
into the set of our control variables. Table A.1 in Appendix A.1 provides the definitions
and descriptive statistics of the complete set of variables used in this study.
Although we employ a rich set of control variables, estimation of equation (2) is likely
to suffer from an omitted variables bias caused by time-invariant and time-varying unob-
served individual characteristics. An example for unobserved heterogeneity is an individ-
ual’s general resistance to stress. The problem of time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity
can be eliminated by specifying an individual fixed effects model, i.e.,
stressextit = HRPitγ +Xitβ + αi + ηt + it. (3)
Equation (3) contains observations from two panel waves t = 2006 and t = 2011.17 Recall
that the performance appraisals variable is no longer included in the HRP -vector. αi is
the individual-specific, time-invariant effect, ηt is a time fixed effect captured by a time
dummy variable, and it denotes an idiosyncratic error term with zero mean and finite
variance. Vector X now additionally includes a dummy indicating whether individuals
have changed jobs between the two observations in time. This dummy allows to decrease
issues associated with possible self-selection into jobs according to individual stress pref-
erences. Equation (3) is estimated using both the pooled OLS (thereby ignoring αi) and
the within estimator.
5 Results
The first three columns of Table 2 display the estimation results according to equation (2).
Column (1) contains the results for the variables in HRP without control variables X.
The estimates in column (2) refer to an OLS regression of stressext on HRP and controls
for live events. Compared to column (1), the coefficients for the HRP variables in column
(2) remain virtually unchanged in terms of both size and significance level. Apart from
“salary adequate”, each of the other HRP -variables turns out to be a highly significant
driver of extrinsic stress perception. In contrast, an adequate salary apparently reduces
an individual’s perceived extrinsic stress intensity. The corresponding parameter estimate
is negative and highly significant at the 1%-level. Interestingly, life events are almost
17With panel data consisting of only two periods the fixed effects estimator is algebraically the same
as a first difference estimator (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
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irrelevant concerning their association with the extrinsic stress index.18 We attribute
this somewhat surprising finding to the way we measure stress, namely as the perceived
burden of very work-specific things such as time pressure or interruptions.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Column (3) displays the results for the HRP -variables conditioned on the complete
set of control variables X. Here, it can be noticed that the coefficient for the PC variable
becomes insignificant. Furthermore, also the coefficients for SMWT and Paid overtime
become smaller but remain statistically significant. The remaining HRP -variables for
employer-determined working time, flextime, salary adequacy, regular performance ap-
praisals, and bad promotion prospects remain statistically significant at the 1%-level
indicating a strong positive association with extrinsic stress intensity.
The panel estimates displayed in columns (4) and (5) do not include the coefficients
for the performance appraisal variable any more. In addition, note that the pooled OLS
estimates in column (4) are based on the unbalanced full sample including individuals
whose responses are only observed in one of the two periods, while the fixed effects esti-
mates refer to a balanced panel that only consists of individuals with responses in both
periods. While the pooled OLS estimates are mostly in line with the cross-sectional
estimates displayed in column (3), the parameter estimates from the fixed effects model
specified in equation (3) reveal a remarkable difference with respect to the variables for an
employee’s working time arrangements. More precisely, when accounting for unobserved
individual fixed effects, the coefficients for the flextime and the self-managed working time
variable are no longer statistically significant, meaning that workers in these regimes are
unlikely to suffer from more extrinsic stress. However, we still observe a highly signifi-
cant positive association between employer-determined working time and extrinsic stress
intensity. Similarly, accounting for individual fixed effects does not affect the significance
of the remaining HRP -variables, i.e., paid overtime, salary adequacy, and bad promotion
prospects.19 As a consequence, we can conclude so far that employer-determined working
time, paid overtime, and bad promotion prospects are found to be positively associated
with extrinsic stress intensity, while salary adequacy apparently mitigates extrinsic stress
18The only life event exhibiting a weak statistic association with the extrinsic stress index is the death
of a close family member. The coefficients of life events are not reported here, but available from the
authors upon request.
19In order to test our assumption that stress levels may be prone to unobserved individual time-
invariant effects, we run an auxiliary regression of the stress index on all personnel policy measures,
control variables as well as the averages of all time-variant covariates. Since the Hausman test is only
valid under homoscedasticity and we cluster our standard errors, we run an auxiliary regression instead
of applying the usual Hausman test (see Wooldridge, 2010). The null hypothesis of the averages of all
time-variant variables being zero is rejected. Thus, our preferred specification is the individual fixed
effects model.
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intensity.20
In attempting to find explanations for our empirical results, we start with the poli-
cy of employer-determined working time. We know from Table 1 that individuals with
flexible working time regimes are more likely to work long hours than individuals with
fixed working time. However, after accounting for unobserved time-constant worker cha-
racteristics only employer-determined working time is found to be a driver of a worker’s
perceived stress intensity. This indicates that longer and flexible working hours do not
not necessarily need to be stress-enhancing. In fact, this finding suggests that the lack
of working time autonomy is a potential source of increasing stress at work. It therefore
supports Karasek’s JDC hypothesis, according to which high job demands (here: longer
effective working hours) combined with low levels of perceived job control (as documented
by employer-determined working time) are likely to involve high stress levels.
A similar reasoning can be applied for the paid overtime variable. Paid overtime does
not only indicate longer working hours and thus high job demands, but also less job con-
trol, because overtime is paid suggesting that it is induced by the employer.21 The positive
stress effect can be interpreted to be in accordance with the JDC hypothesis. Moreover,
it is in line with the literature suggesting that longer working hours are detrimental to an
individual’s health (see e.g. Bell et al., 2012; Robone et al., 2011).22
Finally, the positive stress effect for individuals who consider their promotion prospects
as bad supports the theoretical assumption of the ERI model, according to which lower
perceived rewards go along with higher stress perceptions. Consequently, the negative
stress effect for individuals who perceive their salary as adequate supports the hypothesis
that a positive reward situation is negatively associated with extrinsic stress intensity.
20We also conducted separate regression analyses for each of the items entering the extrinsic stress index,
i.e., time pressure due to a heavy work load, frequent interruptions and disturbances, and increasing job
demands over the last years. The resulting parameter estimates are qualitatively similar to the estimates
for the extrinsic stress index. An exception, however, is the paid overtime variable whose coefficients turn
out to be insignificant in each of the separate regressions. The results of these separate regressions are
available from the authors upon request.
21The coefficient of the variable paid overtime is rather small (about 0.019), yet statistically significant
at the 5% level. Given the average number of paid overtime hours in our sample of 0.53 (see Table A.1 in
Appendix A.1) this seems to be a negligible effect. However, when interpreting the effect size one should
keep in mind that this low average is due to a large share of respondents with zero paid overtime hours
per week. This means that those who do have paid overtime hours actually conduct much more than this
average (for our balanced panel this is over 4 hours per week) resulting in a not so small effect for those,
who do actually work overtime.
22We also added interaction terms of the paid overtime variable with the working time arrangement
dummies to equation (3) but obtained no significant effect. This indicates that there is no mutual
reinforcing impact of the considered HRP practices on extrinsic stress perception.
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6 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we aim at checking the robustness of our results obtained in the previous
section. We proceed in three steps. First, we replace our dependent variable, i.e., the
extrinsic stress index, with an intrinsic stress index that will be derived in equation (4).
Second, we estimate equation (3) separated for male and female workers. We proceed in
that way because we believe that there may be a systematic difference of work-related
outcomes by gender. For example, today women still provide the larger share of household
production and may therefore suffer more from time-consuming personnel policies such
as paid overtime. Moreover, female workers may be more likely to be involved in certain
flexible working time arrangements than male workers. Finally, we exploit an exogenous
source of variation in our HRP measures by focusing on individuals who have not changed
their jobs between the two observation periods 2006 and 2011. We thereby address a
potential limitation of our empirical approach in the previous section, where we explicitly
account for time-constant unobserved worker characteristics but not for other endogeneity
issues such as reversed causality or selectivity.
6.1 Effects on intrinsic stress index
We enrich our analysis with a further dependent variable, the intrinsic stress index. The in-
trinsic stress index consists of six items measuring an individual’s intrinsic coping pattern
with job stress. These items are: (i) “At work, I easily get into time pressure” (TIME-
PRESS), (ii) “I often think about work-related problems when I wake up” (WPWU), (iii)
“When I get home, it is easy to switch off from work” (EASYSO),23 (iv) “Those closest
to me say I sacrifice too much for my career” (SACCAR), (v) “Work seldom lets go of
me; it stays in my head all evening” (EVENING), and (vi) “If I put off something that
needs to be done that day, I can’t sleep at night” (BADSLEEP). For all these items the
respondents are asked to what extent they agree to the presented statements on a 1 (“not
at all”) to 4 (“very heavily”) scale.24 We then proceed as in the case of the extrinsic stress
index, i.e., at first we standardize the score of each item, before we standardize the sum
of these six standardized items:
stressintit =STD[STD(TIMEPRESSit) + STD(WPWUit) + STD(EASY SOit)
+STD(SACCARit) + STD(EV ENINGit) + STD(BADSLEEPit)].
(4)
We end up with an intrinsic stress index, stressintit for individual i at time t, with mean
0 and variance 1.
23The response to this question was reversed, before inclusion into the overall score.
24These items represent an operationalization of the overcommitment component in the ERI model
(Siegrist et al., 2009).
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Table 3 presents the estimation results of the regression models
stressinti = HRPiγ +Xiβ + ui (5)
and
stressintit = HRPitγ +Xitβ + αi + ηt + it, (6)
which differ from equations (2) and (3) only with respect to the dependent variable, i.e.,
stressext is replaced by stressint. Recall that according to Siegrist (1996) the intrinsic
stress index measures an individual’s coping pattern with the overall job situation.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
The estimation results of equations (5) and (6) are qualitatively very similar to the
previous findings. According to our preferred fixed effects specification in column (5),
employer-determined working time, paid overtime, and bad promotion prospects turn out
to be positively related to intrinsic stress intensity, while salary adequacy and intrinsic
stress level are negatively associated. Moreover, the cross-sectional estimates for the
performance appraisal variable also confirm the corresponding estimates in Section 5, i.e.,
regular performance appraisals are positively associated with a worker’s intrinsic stress
intensity.
6.2 Splitting the sample by gender
It is possible that perceived extrinsic stress intensity is differently affected by a firm’s
personnel policy depending on whether the concerned worker is male or female. Specifi-
cally, we assume that owing to their higher involvement in household production, female
workers may suffer more from policies that go along with longer working hours than male
workers. For example, time pressure may be more important when a worker has to leave
work at a certain time to meet family or other obligations. In other words, the time
constraint (i.e., the allocation of time budget) may be more binding for female workers
than for male workers.
In Table 4 we present the pooled OLS and the individual fixed effects estimations
resulting from equation (3) separated for male and female workers.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
Columns (1) and (2) display the pooled OLS and fixed effects parameter estimates for
male workers, while columns (3) and (4) show the corresponding estimates for female
workers. Most results are very similar in the male and the female sample. However,
there is one important exception. Apparently, male workers in flexible working time
arrangements are less likely to perceive higher extrinsic stress levels than female workers.
15
According to our preferred fixed effects estimates, the most remarkable result is that
employer-determined working time significantly increases extrinsic stress level for female
but not for male workers. This leads to the conclusion that the overall positive effect of
employer-determined working time on extrinsic stress level found in Section 5 is mainly
driven by female workers. Obviously, female workers suffer more from lacking control over
working hours than male workers. This may result from a more constrained time budget
of female workers in their private lives as female workers are more likely to be forced to
coordinate work and family issues than male workers.
The positive effect of employer-determined working time on extrinsic stress level in
the sample of female workers is also in line with the findings of Bell et al. (2012) who find
a negative effect of overwork on subjective health for women, even if their actual working
hours range between 20–35 hours per week. Similar to us, the authors attribute these
results to possibly more binding time constraints in the private life of female workers.
6.3 Exploiting exogenous variation
Our econometric approach does not allow for establishing causal effects, because fixed
effects estimates do only account for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity but not for
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. For example, reverse causality leads to a potential
endogeneity bias that cannot be eliminated by applying a fixed effects estimation strategy.
In our case, especially the subjective HRP variables indicating salary adequacy and pro-
motion prospects appear to be prone to reverse causality. Another endogeneity problem
that usually cannot be completely ruled out via fixed effects estimations is selectivity.
In the present case, for example, (self-)selection of workers into flexible working time
arrangements or paid overtime might also depend on unobserved time-varying factors.
A common solution in these cases is the implementation of an instrumental variables
(IV) approach (Antonakis et al., 2010). However, given the objective of our analysis,
i.e., testing the impact of several personnel policies on a worker’s stress level instead of
focusing on one specific policy, it is rather impossible to find suitable instruments for
several policies at once. We considered to decompose the analysis by regressing stress
intensity on single personnel policies and instrumenting those.25 However, the considered
instruments were either too weak and/or failed to satisfy the exclusion restriction, so we
finally abstained from experimenting with an IV estimation approach.
Although we cannot completely account for the sources of time-varying endogeneity,
we can at least alleviate these endogeneity issues to some extent by restricting our sample
to individuals who did not change jobs between the two observation periods 2006 and
2011. Proceeding in that way, we exploit an exogenous source of variation in our HRP
25For instance, we considered union membership and the amount of close friends as instruments for
salary adequacy.
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measures, because it can be argued that individuals who do not change their jobs over
a period of five years are unlikely to cause modifications regarding certain personnel
policies on their own. Hence, observed changes in personnel policies must be induced by
the employer rather than being a worker’s response to stress burden. While the benefit
of this approach remains arguable with respect to our subjective explanatory variables
(i.e., salary adequacy and promotion prospects), it seems to be a reasonable procedure to
address endogeneity issues regarding the variables of paid overtime, flexible working time
arrangements and the provision of a computer.26
Table 5 presents the results from exploiting exogenous variation for both the extrinsic
and the intrinsic stress indices, where the focus is on the estimation of equations (3) and
(6).
[Insert Table 5 about here]
We can ascertain that the parameter estimates qualitatively remain quite stable for the
majority of our considered HRP variables. Specifically, bad promotion prospects are still
found to increase both extrinsic and intrinsic stress intensity, while the reverse is still true
for salary adequacy. Moreover, as before employer-determined working time is the only
policy of flexible working time that turns out to increase extrinsic and intrinsic stress
intensity in the fixed effects specification. However, in the extrinsic stress intensity model
the significance of the point estimate drops from the 1%- to the 10%-level. Nevertheless,
assuming that selection into working time regimes is induced by the employer rather than
being the result of a worker’s self-selection via job change, we can confirm our previous
conclusion according to which low levels of working time autonomy tend to increase work-
related stress.
There are also some interesting differences in the parameter estimates compared to
the results discussed in Section 5. First, paid overtime is still a significant driver of
intrinsic stress intensity, but this does no longer hold for extrinsic stress intensity. Thus,
our previous interpretation that paid overtime is associated with higher extrinsic stress
levels should be regarded with some caution. Second, on the contrary to our previous
fixed effects estimations, where the provision of a computer for private use does not turn
out to be a significant predictor of extrinsic or intrinsic stress intensity, this variable is
now weakly significant with a negative sign in the fixed effects model for extrinsic stress
26Exploiting exogenous variation in the described way is a quite common approach in the commuting
literature. A strand of literature utilizes the approach of focusing on individuals that did not change their
jobs or their place of residence in order to analyse the effect of commuting time on work-related outcomes.
Here, it is argued that after excluding job and residence changers the observed variation in commuting
time/distance must be attributable to plant shifts by the employer and is therefore exogenous for the
observed individuals. Recent applications include, for example, Lorenz and Goerke (2015) who utilize
this strategy to evaluate the effects of commuting on sickness absence in Germany relying on data from
the SOEP or Roberts et al. (2011) who regard the gender specific effects of commuting on psychological
health.
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intensity and weakly significant with a positive sign in the fixed effects model for intrinsic
stress intensity. A possible explanation for these contradicting findings is that, while the
provision of a computer for private use can involve higher job demands, it can also go
along with higher working time autonomy. However, we should not put too much weight
on these results and interpretation, because of the fact that the incidence of providing
computers for private use as a fringe benefit in our sample is very low (about 4%), meaning
that the estimates may merely result from a lack of variation.
7 Conclusion
The objective of this study was to investigate the associations between various personnel
policies and work-related stress. Our empirical results can be summarized as follows:
First, after accounting for time-constant unobserved individual characteristics we find that
salary adequacy turns out to reduce both extrinsic and intrinsic stress intensity, while bad
promotion prospects, employer-determined working time, and paid overtime contribute to
increase these stress indicators. In contrast to this finding, policies of flexible working time
that involve some working time autonomy (i.e., self-managed working time and flextime)
are found to be unrelated to higher stress levels. Second, after splitting the sample with
respect to gender, we find that the positive effect of employer-determined working time
on extrinsic stress intensity can only be observed in the sub-sample of female workers but
not in the sub-sample of male workers, suggesting that female workers are more likely to
be time-constrained owing to the obligation to coordinate work and family issues. Finally,
after exploiting a source of exogenous variation with regard to the considered personnel
policies to alleviate potential time-varying endogeneity issues, the previous results remain
stable except for paid overtime whose estimated coefficients fail to be significant in the
extrinsic stress index model (but not in the intrinsic stress index model).
The results for paid overtime and the flexible working time policies are consistent
with Karasek’s Job Demand-Control (JDC) model, according to which high job demands
(longer working hours) combined with low job control (low working time autonomy in
the form of employer-determined working time as well as employer-induced overtime)
are likely to increase stress at work and subsequently, to endanger an individual’s health.
Therefore, the general conclusion is that long working hours are likely to have detrimental
consequences for worker health in absence of control over scheduling individual working
time (Bassanini and Caroli, 2014). Consequently, despite the fact that workers in self-
managed working time and flextime arrangements also work, on average, more hours than
their counterparts with fixed working time, they are not found to suffer from higher stress
levels, which can be attributed to higher time sovereignty mitigating the stress-enhancing
consequences of longer working hours.
Furthermore, it is obvious to relate our results for bad promotion prospects and salary
18
adequacy to Siegrist’s Effort-Reward Imbalance (ERI) model. According to this model,
a good reward situation mitigates perceived stress intensity, while the opposite is true
for unfavourable reward situations. Our empirical results for salary adequacy and bad
promotion prospects insistently confirm this view.
Finally, we should not forget that according to the results of a cross-sectional analysis
workers who are subject to regular performance appraisals, experience significantly higher
perceived stress levels. This association indicates that performance appraisals increase
a worker’s job demands. Although the estimated effect at the cross-sectional level is
relatively strong, one should be careful with regard to a more detailed interpretation,
because owing to lacking data availability we can only estimate the performance appraisal
effect based on conditional correlations without any endogeneity correction.
A potential limitation of this study is that the estimated effects of personnel policies
on a worker’s stress level cannot be interpreted in a causal manner. However, we should
have been able to limit potential endogeneity concerns to a large extent by applying fixed
effects models and by restricting the analysis to a sub-sample that allows us to exploit
some of the exogenous variation of the considered personnel policies. Nevertheless, our
empirical results have to be interpreted somewhat cautiously and in a merely associative
manner.
Furthermore, one might be concerned about the utilization of subjective dependent
(perceived stress levels) and explanatory variables (promotion prospects, salary adequacy
representing the perceived individual reward situation). A possible problem with such an
approach is that the relation between dependent and explanatory variables may be driven
by person-specific unobserved factors such as certain personality traits. In accordance with
Bell et al. (2012) who regress self-assessed health on subjective measures of overwork, we
argue that the estimation of individual fixed effects models should sufficiently take this
issue into account.
Despite the necessity to interpret our estimation results carefully, we can derive some
management implications that employers should consider in their own interest to save costs
caused by increased stress intensities. First, employers should pay attention to adequate
salaries, because adequate salaries contribute to an improved effort–reward (im)balance.
Second, for the same reason employers can be advised to offer good promotion prospects.
Finally, employers should reduce the amount of flexible working hours, when flexibility is
determined by the employer. Instead, employers should consider granting their employees
more job control, for example, via flextime or self-managed working time arrangements.
Even if job demands are high, policies of increasing job control can help to mitigate the
consequences of rising stress at work.
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Tables and figures
Figure 1: Extrinsic stress index and human resource practices
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Notes: The above figure depicts the extrinsic stress index by categories of the main explanatory variables.
These are: (1a) benefit PC, (1b) working time arrangements, (1c) paid overtime last month (discrete
variable summarized into two categories, 0 and >0, hours rescaled to weekly level), (1d) bad promotion
prospects, (1e) salary adequate, and (1f) performance appraisals.
All figures are box plots with the median being marked bold. The upper box range is the 75th percentile
(x75), and the lower range is the 25th percentile (x25). The upper whisker bound is located at x75+1.5×
(75th − 25th) and the lower whisker bound is located at x25 − 1.5× (75th − 25th).
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 2006 and 2011, own calculations.
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Table 1: Effective and contractual working hours per week by working time arrangements
Working time arrangement Working hours per week
Effective hours Contractual hours
Share in
%
Mean Std Mean Std
Fixed working time (FWT) 42.22 37.88 9.51 35.09 7.98
Employer-determined working time (EDWT) 20.78 39.29 10.42 34.55 8.16
Self-managed working time (SMWT) 10.10 44.29 12.02 36.20 7.87
Flextime within a working hours account (FT) 26.90 40.51 7.80 36.62 5.94
Notes: Std is the standard deviation. Share in % indicates the sample share of the individuals having
the particular working time arrangement.
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 2006 and 2011, own calculations.
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Table 2: Personnel policy and the extrinsic stress score
Dependent variable Extrinsic stress index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE
Benefit PC 0.232*** 0.228*** 0.102 0.072 -0.152
(0.068) (0.068) (0.070) (0.050) (0.093)
EDWT 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.123*** 0.111*** 0.133***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.026) (0.051)
SMWT 0.284*** 0.286*** 0.130*** 0.154*** -0.039
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.036) (0.073)
FT 0.316*** 0.317*** 0.163*** 0.170*** 0.057
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.026) (0.066)
Paid overtime 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.015* 0.016*** 0.019**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.009)
Salary adequate -0.466*** -0.467*** -0.456*** -0.421*** -0.172***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.020) (0.039)
Bad promotion prospects 0.232*** 0.231*** 0.241*** 0.218*** 0.219***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.020) (0.037)
Performance appraisals 0.209*** 0.208*** 0.113***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.033)
Life events NO YES YES YES YES
Controls NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 4,343 4,343 4,343 9,562 4,800
Adj. R2 / R-within 0.111 0.111 0.188 0.160 0.063
Notes: ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level. The values in parentheses represent heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (columns (1)
- (4)) and robust standard errors clustered at the individual-level (column (5), 2,400 individuals). The extrinsic stress index is defined in equation 1 in Section
3.1. The specification in column (2) controls for birth of a child, separation or divorce from partner or spouse, and death of a close relative. The specifications
in columns (3)-(5) contain a set of covariates: age†, age squared†, years of schooling†, gender†, nationality†, marital status, children in the household under
16, birth of a child, separation or divorce from partner or spouse, death of a close relative, self-reported health status, number of hours devoted to leisure-time
activities, log monthly gross wage, weekly contracted working hours, type of employment contract (fixed-term vs. permanent), tenure with the company, years
unemployed, years in part-time employment, management position, public employee, job changed between observations, company size, 8 industry dummies, time
(2011)‡ and regional (East Germany) dummies. The time-invariant variables, marked with a †, are not included in specifications in column (5). The time dummy
for 2011, marked with a ‡ is not included in the cross-sectional specification in column (3). The descriptive statistics for all covariates can be found in Table A.1
in Appendix A.1.
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 2006 and 2011, own calculations.
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Table 3: Personnel policy and the intrinsic stress score
Dependent variable Intrinsic stress index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS FE
Benefit PC 0.374*** 0.376*** 0.294*** 0.211*** 0.129
(0.068) (0.068) (0.067) (0.050) (0.101)
EDWT 0.239*** 0.242*** 0.176*** 0.176*** 0.116**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.026) (0.047)
SMWT 0.398*** 0.398*** 0.262*** 0.240*** 0.072
(0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.037) (0.070)
FT 0.146*** 0.148*** 0.043 0.039 0.002
(0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.026) (0.060)
Paid overtime 0.017** 0.018** 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.026***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.010)
Salary adequate -0.380*** -0.382*** -0.325*** -0.300*** -0.127***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.021) (0.036)
Bad promotion prospects 0.137*** 0.139*** 0.112*** 0.072*** 0.124***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.021) (0.036)
Performance appraisals 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.070**
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032)
Life events NO YES YES YES YES
Controls NO NO YES YES YES
Observations 4,321 4,321 4,321 9,541 4,788
Adj. R2 / R-within 0.075 0.075 0.162 0.149 0.057
Notes: ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level. The values in parentheses represent heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (columns (1)
- (4)) and robust standard errors clustered at the individual-level (column (5), 2,394 individuals). The instrinsic stress index is defined in equation 4 in Section
6.1. The specification in column (2) controls for birth of a child, separation or divorce from partner or spouse, and death of a close relative. The specifications
in columns (3)-(5) contain a set of covariates: age†, age squared†, years of schooling†, gender†, nationality†, marital status, children in the household under
16, birth of a child, separation or divorce from partner or spouse, death of a close relative, self-reported health status, number of hours devoted to leisure-time
activities, log monthly gross wage, weekly contracted working hours, type of employment contract (fixed-term vs. permanent), tenure with the company, years
unemployed, years in part-time employment, management position, public employee, job changed between observations, company size, 8 industry dummies, time
(2011)‡ and regional (East Germany) dummies. The time-invariant variables, marked with a †, are not included in specifications in column (5). The time dummy
for 2011, marked with a ‡ is not included in the cross-sectional specification in column (3). The descriptive statistics for all covariates can be found in Table A.1
in Appendix A.1.
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 2006 and 2011, own calculations.
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Table 4: Personnel policy and the extrinsic stress score by gender
Dependent variable Extrinsic stress index
male sample female sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE OLS FE
Benefit PC -0.020 -0.120 -0.024 -0.188
(0.086) (0.115) (0.142) (0.149)
EDWT 0.008 0.078 0.169*** 0.188**
(0.052) (0.067) (0.053) (0.076)
SMWT 0.099 -0.124 0.194** 0.098
(0.068) (0.092) (0.093) (0.115)
FT 0.183*** 0.033 0.160*** 0.090
(0.049) (0.084) (0.054) (0.099)
Paid overtime 0.010 0.021* 0.016 0.024*
(0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Salary adequate -0.410*** -0.133** -0.452*** -0.200***
(0.039) (0.054) (0.042) (0.057)
Bad promotion prospects 0.188*** 0.184*** 0.246*** 0.233***
(0.039) (0.049) (0.044) (0.055)
Life events YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 2,640 2,640 2,160 2,160
Adj. R2 / R-within 0.159 0.067 0.191 0.094
Notes: ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level. The values in parentheses represent
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (columns (1) and (2)) and robust standard errors clustered at
the individual-level (columns (2) and (4), 1,320 and 1,080 individuals). The extrinsic stress index is
defined in equation 1 in Section 3.1. All specifications contain a set of covariates: age†, age squared†,
years of schooling†, gender†, nationality†, marital status, children in the household under 16, birth of
a child, separation or divorce from partner or spouse, death of a close relative, self-reported health
status, number of hours devoted to leisure-time activities, log monthly gross wage, weekly contracted
working hours, type of employment contract (fixed-term vs. permanent), tenure with the company, years
unemployed, years in part-time employment, management position, public employee, job changed between
observations, company size, 8 industry dummies, time (2011) and regional (East Germany) dummies. The
time-invariant variables, marked with a †, are not included in specifications in columns (2) and (4). The
descriptive statistics for all covariates can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix A.1.
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 2006 and 2011, own calculations.
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Table 5: Personnel policy and job stayers sample
Dependent variable Extrinsic stress index Intrinsic stress index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FE OLS FE
Benefit PC -0.091 -0.204* 0.276*** 0.212*
(0.087) (0.115) (0.082) (0.121)
EDWT 0.109*** 0.103* 0.174*** 0.115**
(0.041) (0.054) (0.041) (0.051)
SMWT 0.140** -0.070 0.224*** 0.076
(0.060) (0.081) (0.061) (0.075)
FT 0.197*** 0.092 0.032 0.047
(0.039) (0.073) (0.039) (0.067)
Paid overtime 0.010 0.005 0.029*** 0.025**
(0.008) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011)
Salary adequate -0.441*** -0.147*** -0.328*** -0.113***
(0.031) (0.043) (0.032) (0.039)
Bad promotion prospects 0.197*** 0.241*** 0.063* 0.128***
(0.032) (0.040) (0.033) (0.039)
Life events YES YES YES YES
Controls YES YES YES YES
Observations 4,016 4,016 4,014 4,014
Adj. R2 / R-within 0.169 0.056 0.158 0.052
Notes: ∗/∗∗/∗∗∗ denotes statistical significance at the 10/5/1% level. The values in parentheses represent
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (columns (1) and (2)) and robust standard errors clustered at
the individual-level (columns (2) and (4), 2,008 and 2,007 individuals). The stress indices are defined in
equations 1 and 4 in Sections 3.1 and 6.1. All specifications contain a set of covariates: age†, age squared†,
years of schooling†, gender†, nationality†, marital status, children in the household under 16, birth of
a child, separation or divorce from partner or spouse, death of a close relative, self-reported health
status, number of hours devoted to leisure-time activities, log monthly gross wage, weekly contracted
working hours, type of employment contract (fixed-term vs. permanent), tenure with the company, years
unemployed, years in part-time employment, management position, public employee, job changed between
observations, company size, 8 industry dummies, time (2011) and regional (East Germany) dummies. The
time-invariant variables, marked with a †, are not included in specifications in columns (2) and (4). The
descriptive statistics for all covariates can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix A.1.
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 2006 and 2011, own calculations.
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A Appendix
A.1 Summary statistics
Table A.1: Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables
Variable Definition N Mean Std Min-Max
Dependent variables
Extrinsic stress index Standardized index of three extrinsic stress
items (see Section 3.1)
9562 0.00 1.00 -1.49 - 2.38
Intrinsic stress index Standardized index of six intrinsic stress items
(see Section 6.1)
9541 0.00 1.00 -2.02 - 2.87
Main explanatory variables
Benefit PC Dummy variable indicating whether or not re-
spondent receives a computer/laptop for per-
sonal use
9562 0.04 0.19 0 - 1
Fixed working time
(FWT)
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee has fixed working times (serves as ref-
erence category in the analysis)
9562 0.42 0.49 0 - 1
Employer-determined
working time (EDWT)
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee faces flexible working hours deter-
mined by the employer (reference category:
FWT)
9562 0.21 0.41 0 - 1
Self-managed working
time (SMWT )
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee has extensive decision-making au-
thority in terms of scheduling individual work-
ing hours (reference category: FWT)
9562 0.1 0.3 0 - 1
Flextime within a work-
ing hours account (FT)
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee is allowed to vary daily working hours,
where daily attendance is restricted to a defined
time interval (working hours account) (refer-
ence category: FWT)
9562 0.27 0.44 0 - 1
Salary adequate Dummy variable indicating whether or not re-
spondent considers his salary adequate given his
efforts and achievements
9562 0.48 0.5 0 - 1
Performance appraisals Dummy variable indicating whether or not re-
spondent’s performance is regularly assessed by
a superior
4343 0.4 0.49 0 - 1
Overtime paid Number of paid overtime hours last month 9562 0.53 1.94 0 - 22.85
Bad promotion prospects Dummy variable indicating whether respondent
perceives promotion prospects in his company
as bad
9562 0.67 0.47 0 - 1
Continued on next page...
I
... Table A.1 continued
Variable Definition N Mean Std Min-Max
Control variables
Male Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee is male
9562 0.53 0.5 0 - 1
Age Age of respondent 9562 44.99 9.7 20 - 65
Age squared Age of respondent squared and divided by 100 9562 21.18 8.58 4 - 42.25
Foreign nationality Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee is of non-German nationality
9562 0.05 0.22 0 - 1
Schooling Years of schooling 9562 12.75 2.67 7 - 18
Marital status Dummy variable indicating whether or not in-
dividual has a settled living partner
9562 0.79 0.41 0 - 1
Children aged under 16 Dummy variable indicating whether an individ-
ual has one or more children aged under 16 who
currently live in the household
9562 0.34 0.47 0 - 1
Monthly gross wage Gross wage of the respondent in the month be-
fore the survey (logarithm)
9562 7.79 0.56 5.99 - 10.13
Fixed-term contract Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee has a fixed-term contract
9562 0.04 0.19 0 - 1
Job tenure Years of an employee’s job tenure 9562 14.04 9.91 1.2 - 49.8
Part-time experience Years of an employee’s experience in a part-time
job
9562 3.19 5.85 0 - 39.20
Unemployment experi-
ence
Years of a worker’s unemployment experience 9562 0.47 1.25 0 - 24
Contractual working
hours
Weekly working hours as according to employ-
ment contract
9562 35.5 7.56 1 - 72
Management Dummy variable indicating whether employee
holds a management position
9562 0.2 0.4 0 - 1
Public service Dummy variable indicating whether employee
is a public servant
9562 0.14 0.35 0 - 1
Job changed Dummy variable indicating whether employee
works in the same company in both waves
9562 0.3 0.46 0 - 1
Firm size 1-19 Dummy variable indicating whether respondent
works in a firm with 1 to 19 employees (serves
as reference category in the analysis)
9562 0.18 0.39 0 - 1
Firm size 20-199 Dummy variable indicating whether respondent
works in a firm with 20 to 199 employees (ref-
erence category: <20)
9562 0.31 0.46 0 - 1
Firm size 200-1999 Dummy variable indicating whether respondent
works in a firm with 200 to 1999 employees (ref-
erence category: <20)
9562 0.25 0.43 0 - 1
Firm size ≥ 2000 Dummy variable indicating whether respondent
works in a firm with equal or more than 2000
employees (reference category: <20)
9562 0.26 0.44 0 - 1
Continued on next page...
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... Table A.1 continued
Variable Definition N Mean Std Min-Max
Hobbies and other
leisure activities
Number of hours devoted to hobbies and other
leisure activities on a typical working day
9562 1.67 1.27 0 - 13
Current health: very
good
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee assesses her current health status as
very good (serves as reference category in the
analysis)
9562 0.07 0.26 0 - 1
Current health: good Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee assesses her current health status as
good (reference category: very good)
9562 0.47 0.5 0 - 1
Current health: satis-
factory
Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee assesses her current health status as
satisfactory (reference category: very good)
9562 0.34 0.47 0 - 1
Current health: poor Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee assesses her current health status as
poor (reference category: very good)
9562 0.1 0.31 0 - 1
Current health: bad Dummy variable indicating whether or not an
employee assesses her current health status as
bad (reference category: very good)
9562 0.02 0.12 0 - 1
Separation from partner
or divorce
Dummy variable indicating whether respondent
has been divorced or separated from partner in
the survey year
9562 0.03 0.16 0 - 1
Child born Dummy variable indicating whether respondent
became a parent in the survey year
9562 0.02 0.13 0 - 1
Death in family Death of a close family member in the year of
the survey
9562 0.03 0.17 0 - 1
East Germany Dummy variable indicating whether respondent
lives in East Germany
9562 0.24 0.43 0 - 1
Time dummies Two dummies for the survey years 2006 and
2011
Sector dummies 9 dummy variables for the industry a respon-
dent is employed in
Notes: N is the number of observations. Std is the standard deviation.
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), waves 2006 and 2011, own calculations.
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